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Robyn Fyffe #7063
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 34 3-1000
(208) 345-8274 (f)
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
IAN ROBERT LANDON HERBST
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 39921-2012

APPELLANT'S OPENING
BRIEF

COMES NOW, Appellant Ian Herbst, through counsel Robyn Fyffe, and offers this
Opening Brief in accord with IAR 35(h).

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district court's order revoking probation and withheld
judgment and imposing sentence.

Procedural History and Statement of Fact
In October 2009, when Ian was nineteen years old, he entered the homes of several
neighbors and took their belongings to support his opiate addition. See CR p. 36-38; PSI p. 3-4.
On January 13, 2010, Ian pied guilty to three charges of burglary and one count of grand theft in
exchange for the State's agreement to dismiss the remaining charges and cap its sentencing
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recommendations at a unified term of ten years with a minimum period of confinement of two
years, with the district court retainingjurisdiction. CR p. 43-44; Tr. p. 5, In. 15-25.
On March 17, 2010, the district court withheld judgment for thirty years and placed Ian
on probation conditioned on his successful completion of Drug Court. CR p. 57-58, 65-67; Tr. p.
24, In. 22 - p. 25, In. 5; p. 27, In. 8-12. The district court further instructed Ian that he could not
"have cable or satellite television until your restitution is paid" and that Ian was "not going to
spend money on frivolous things until [he pays] restitution." Tr. p. 28, In. 4-12; see also CR p.
58. In June 2010, Ian tested positive for opiates and in February 2011, he allegedly lied about the
number of Cognitive Self-Change thinking reports he had prepared. See CR 116.
After this initial rocky start, Ian made great gains. On March 15, 2011, Ian "phased up"
in Drug Court with ninety days of sobriety and the district court told him she was "very
impressed" as there had been a time she "was arguing with [his] attorney, that's it, I've had
enough, he's gone. So big change." Tr. p. 34, ln. 8-16. The district court told Ian that she
wanted:
to really congratulate you because I found out a couple of things ... your
presentation to your group was unique; it wasn't just cookie cutter. I also found
out that not only are you working full time, but you're volunteering at
Intermountain with other addicts and that you're also helping sponsor a youth
lacrosse team. That I mean, those are - that's not the same Herbst that I knew
from last year; right?
Tr. p. 35, In. 23 - p. 36, ln. 9.
On August 23, 2011, the district court again congratulated Ian on his progress and
promoted him to Phase Three. CR p. 85-86; Tr. p. 41, In. 23-35. On August 29, 2011, Ian
allegedly tested positive for alcohol and lied to the Drug Court probations officers about
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attending a concert where alcohol was served. CR p. 115. On September 21, 2011, Ian failed to
attend his morning breathalyzer. Id. On September 27, 2011, Ian was sanctioned with one day of
Sheriffs Inmate Labor Detail. Id. at p. 91. In October 2011, Ian failed to pay restitution as
ordered and to attend a morning breathalyzer. Id. at p. 115. On October 27,201 L Ian paid $170
towards his restitution. Id. at p. 104. In November 2011, Ian was accused of testing positive for
morphine. Id. at p. 115. On November 23 and 27, 2011, Ian made $15 restitution payments.
Notwithstanding these set backs, Ian again completed Phase Two and on January 10,
2012, re-phased into Phase Three of Drug Court. Tr. p. 43-44. Ian told the district court that he
had five months of sobriety, was learning to manage his money and that reaching out to people
and helping them gave him a "better feeling than anything else." Tr. p. 44, ln. 9-17. The district
court congratulated Ian and told him he had made a big step. Tr. p. 44, ln. 18-21. On January 23,
2012, Ian made a $18 restitution payment and on February 17, he paid $15. CR p. 104.
On February 21, 2012, Ian was accused of violating his curfew and lying to the Drug
Court probation officers about the time of his curfew. CR p. 115. On February 28, 2012, Ian lied
to his Drug Court counselor about going snowboarding with another Drug Court participant. Id.
On March 14, 2012, the State moved for Ian's discharge from Drug Court outlining all rule
violations since Ian first entered the program. Id. at p. 114-16. The State also filed a motion for
probation violating alleging that Ian failed to successfully complete the Ada County Drug Court,
failed to pay costs and fees as ordered, and failed to pay restitution. Id. at p. 101-102. Ian
admitted violating the terms of Drug Court and his probation as alleged by the State. Tr. p. 57,
In. 10-23.
At disposition, the district court informed him that "the reason you are here today ... is
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the continuing to lie.'' Id. at p. 75, In. 4-6. The district court described instances in which Ian
was dishonest about having a checking account and attending a concert where alcohol was
served. Tr. p. 75, In. 22 - p. 76, In. 22. The district com1 was not convinced Ian would not
commit additional burglaries because "the attitude ... that you demontrated in drug court is no
concern for victims, no effort to repay them for what you stole from them." 1 Id. at p. 76, In. 23 p. 77, ln. 3. The district court explained that Ian failed to understand why he would not be
allowed to have a big screen television reiterated until he paid his victims back, he could not
have luxuries. Id. at p. 77, ln. 1-24. The district court reiterated that "the reason you're here
today is because all of the way through drug court you only focused on what you wanted, [and]
the rules you didn't want to comply with and the constant lying and the fact you tried to get other
people to participate." Id. at p. 77, In. 25 - p. 78, ln. 5.
Not only did the district court discharge Ian from Drug Court and revoke his withheld
judgment, the district court refused Ian's request for a period of retained jurisdiction. Instead, the
district court imposed consecutive unified terms totaling thirty years by sentencing Ian to a
unified tenn of ten years with a minimum period of confinement of two years and six months
followed by a consecutive indeterminate term of ten years and two consecutive indeterminate
terms of five years. This appeal follows.

Issues Presented on Appeal

1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in refusing to retain jurisdiction?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in imposing an excessive sentence?

Based on the payment history attached to the State's motion, it appears that Ian did pay
some towards his restitution but apparently did not make payments in a sufficient amount or with
sufficient frequency. See CR p. 104.
1
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Argument
A.

The District Court Abused its Discretion in Refusing to Retain Jurisdiction
The district court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to retain jurisdiction if it has

sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate. State v. Aferwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648, 962 P.2d 1026, 1032 (1998); State v.

Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984). It is within the trial court's
discretion to revoke probation if the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated.
LC. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324,325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct.
App.1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989). In
determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is
achieving the goal ofrehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v.

Upton, 127 Idaho 274,275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834
P.2d at 327.
Ian's probation was most certainly achieving the goal of rehabilitation - Ian made huge
strides in overcoming his opiate addition, furthered his education, was employed and even
volunteering to help improve the lives of others. Like any recovery, whether it be from a medical
condition or overcoming an addiction and thinking errors, Ian's progress had its ups and downs.
Nonetheless, the Ian standing before the district court at the time he was sentenced to prison had
come a long way from the Ian who entered Drug Court two years earlier.
Ian's probation was also consistent with the protection of society. Ian committed no new
crimes while on probation and although he had relapsed in the past, the district court's decision
to discharge Ian from drug court and impose sentence was not based on inadequate progress
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towards overcoming his addition. Rather, the district court focused on the manner in which Ian's
dishonesty effected other drug court participants and Ian's difficulty forgoing "luxuries" such as
a big screen television so he could make larger restitution payments.
The only connection between the district court's refusal to retain jurisdiction and
protection of society was its conclusion that Ian's slow progress in paying restitution translated
into a lack of remorse and that lack of remorse translated into a risk he would steal again. See Tr.
p. 77, In. 1-16. However, Ian was twenty-two years old. His difficulty in forgoing "luxuries"
such as snowboarding and television in order to make larger restitution payments depicts a young
man who continues to struggle with immaturity including the tendency to be selfish. These
characteristics suggest Ian resembles many young men his age, not just a criminal who would
again burglarize persons' homes to support a drug habit.
The district court refused to retain jurisdiction because it did not need "additional
information" and did not think "the programming is going to accomplish what needs to be
accomplished." Tr. p. 80, ln. 8-14. This reasoning ignores the substantial progress Ian made in
Drug Court. That he continued to struggle with immaturity and thinking errors at age twenty-two
suggests that he stood a lot to benefit from the intensive programming offered during a period of
retained jurisdiction, not that his continued rehabilitation would be hopeless.
Ian's performance during Drug Court shows that probation was serving its rehabilitative
purpose and protecting society. His lying about matters such as curfew and his lack of
satisfactory progress in paying restitution warranted sanctions and perhaps even the loss of the
withheld judgment and discharge from Drug Court. :However, Ian's conduct did not warrant
skipping the next two logical steps from an initial probation violation that does not involve a new
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crime - reinstatement following sanctions and retained jurisdiction. Accordingly, the district
court abused its discretion in refusing Ian's request to retain jurisdiction.
B.

The District Court Abused its Discretion in Imposing an Excessive Sentence
When reviewing a sentence ordered into execution following a period of probation, this

Court examines the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.

State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28,218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). Thus, this Court bases its
review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring
between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. Id.
Although this Court generally treats the minimum period of confinement as the probable
duration of confinement, this Court does not wholly disregard the aggregate length of the
sentence, but recognizes that a defendant will be eligible for parole at that time. State v. Casper,
143 Idaho 847,848, 153 P.3d 1193, 1994 (Ct. App. 2006). The indeterminate portion ofa
sentence will be examined on appeal when the defendant shows that special circumstances
require consideration of more than the fixed period of confinement. State v. Bayles, 131 Idaho
624,628, 962 P.2d 395, 399 (Ct. App. 1998).
Initially, because of the extraordinary length of Ian's indeterminate term, the fixed portion
of his sentence - two and one half years - is not the probable duration of confinement. Instead,
the Parole Commission's rules require Ian to serve at least forty-eight months before being
eligible for an initial parole review hearing. See ID APA 50.01.0 l.02(b) (Table One providing
forty-eight months as minimum time to be served before initial parole hearing for sentences of
more than twenty-six years). Thus, Ian will be required to serve four years before the
Commission will even see him to entertain release on parole, making his probable term of
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confinement four years or more.
Ian was a nineteen year old opiate addict who stole items from neighbors' homes to
support his drug habit. At the time oflan's initial sentencing, the State agreed that the nature of
Ian's offenses and his characteristics supported a a unified sentence of ten years. After two years
in Drug Court, Ian made tremendous rehabilitative progress and paid some towards restitution.
His progress in Drug Court illustrates that Ian can remain crime and drug free and support
himself, but might take longer to pay restitution than the district court thinks would be
appropriate. Accordingly, Ian's time on probation supports a lesser sentence, not one of greater
severity.
The district court's decision to sentence Ian to consecutive unified terms of thi11y years
means Ian will serve substantially more than his fixed term of two and one half years. Given the
nature of Ian's offense, his time on probation and his particular characteristics, the sentences are
unreasonable on any view of the facts.
Conclusion
Ian asks this Court to reverse and remand with instructions to order that his sentences run
concurrently and to retain jurisdiction.

DATED this

/3

flday ofNovember, 2012.

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
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Attorneys for Ian Herbst

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
r_] (1-.

I CERTIFY that on November _1 _, 2012, I caused two true and correct copies of the
foregoing document to be:

~ mailed
hand delivered
faxed
to: Idaho Attorney General Criminal Law Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010

8----~
Robyn Fyffe
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